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An abundance of literature on image indexing, visual and
image retrieval methods, content-based image retrieval,
image tagging, visual information seeking, and so on, is
available in information studies. In 2008, decades of devel-
opment with its great diversity in approaches was summed
up as an “evolution” where the literature recently had
“grown at a stupendous rate” (Enser, p. 531). In this
“evolutionary” process, critical inspections are, however,
also needed in specific cases. In the following, three aspects
are in concern: (a) the use of an interpretation model created
by the renowned art historian Erwin Panofsky (1892–1968);
(b) the danger of simplifying theoretical approaches from
domains outside information studies, in this case approaches
from an art historical methodology; and (c) attention to new
“mutations” that might override the old ways of doing
things. In particular, the article “Modeling and Analyzing
the Topicality of Art Images” (Huang, Soergel, & Klavans,
2015), recently published in this journal, will be targeted as
an indication of these aspects.
According to, for example, Enser (2008) and recently
Rafferty and Albinfalah (2014), Panofsky figures prominent-
ly in the literature on image indexing. In particular, Sara
Shatford Layne introduced Panofsky into information stud-
ies. In a well-cited text from 1986, she applied Panofsky’s
three-level model of interpretation (known as pre-
iconography, iconography, and iconology) as a theoretical
approach to subject analysis in art images, stating that
although he developed the model in terms of Renaissance
art, it seemed “possible to apply it to any representational
work” (p. 43). In Enser’s words, Shatford Layne, “. . . was
instrumental in generalizing Panofsky’s analysis, simplify-
ing the first two modes in terms of ’generic’ and ’specific’,
and amplifying these by distinguishing between what a pic-
ture is ’of’ and what it is ’about’ ” (2008, p. 533).
With due regard for Shatford Layne, Huang et al. (2015)
is another contribution with Panofsky as a theoretical prim-
er. In its own words, the article aims at presenting “a
framework for modeling and analyzing image topics and
image tagging that improves our theoretical understanding
of image topicality” (Huang et al., 2015, p. 1616). The scope
of the current text does not allow an in-depth questioning of
theoretical understandings in general, but in this article the
logic of Panofsky’s model is inverted (again) and, in addi-
tion, vernacular art historical practices are taken for granted
as rendering a solid domain specific methodology.
First and foremost, it is worth noticing that the representa-
tional aspect, stressed by Shatford Layne, has now vanished;
pragmatic reflections on image retrieval in general, presented
by, for example, Greisdorf and O’Connor (2008), and specific
critical reflections on the use of Panofsky, presented by, for
example, Burford, Briggs, and Eakins (2003), and also miss-
ing. This neglect is indicative of the manipulation of Panof-
sky’s three strata (1939), which, moreover, are introduced by
a new layer, “Layer 1, the visual features of the image”; all
four layers are inscribed in the so-called “Facet 1: Layers of
image topicality” (Figure 1). Accordingly, the preliminary
features mark “visual elements” (colors, shapes, forms, pat-
terns, lines, and styles), “visual constructs” (relationships
among visual components as well as the coherent structure
held together and ordered by the use of similar shapes, forms,
and colors), and techniques used by the artist, “such as
pointillism” (Huang et al., 2015, p. 1617).
Taking a closer look at Huang et al.’s (2015) argument, it
should be noticed that Pointillism is described as an artist’s
technique at the same time that style is part of the separated
visual elements in Layer 1. This is confusing: Is Pointillism
a technique? Is it not rather a style, such as Rococo, Impres-
sionism, and so on? Probably both in the vernacular of art
history, but Huang et al. (2015) are developing a theoretical
model, so a more accurate terminology might be expected?
The article goes on: “. . . topical relationships on this
layer [Layer 1] are explicit and straightforward”; this layer
“does not focus on high-level meaning, it relies on minimal
context information” (Huang et al., 2015, p. 1617).
“Minimal context information” is changed into “minimal
cultural knowledge” at the first level (2.1) in the next layer,
“Layer 2: Meaning and interpretation,” and this level is
identified as Panofsky’s “pre-iconography,” which is “based
on factual or expressional objects or events that could be
interpreted with minimal cultural knowledge” (Huang et al.,
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2015, p. 1618). At the next sublayer (2.2), “iconography,”
analysis is “based on recognition of individual objects and
historical events using cultural knowledge.”
In defining the upper iconological sublayer (2.3), Panof-
sky is cited explicitly: the intrinsic meaning “. . . ‘is appre-
hended by ascertaining those underlying principles that
reveal the basic attitude of a nation, a period, a class, a reli-
gious or philosophical persuasion – qualified by one person-
ality and condensed into one work’ . . .” (Huang et al., 2015,
p. 1618). This, however, is added on immediately following:
“. . . speaking from the Perspective 1, Art history and theory
with emphasis on the artist’s intent.” This perspective is, in
Huang et al.’s (2015) overall theoretical approach, supple-
mented by “Perspective 2’, ‘Viewer’s perception. Emphasis
on viewer’s response’ ”; both perspectives, constituting the
so-called “Facet 2: Perspectives on image topicality,” can be
applied to each level of “Facet 1: Layers of image top-
icality” (Huang et al., 2015, p. 1617). Huang et al. (2015)
also present a “Facet 3: Image topicality relationships,”
which, although important for their theoretical approach, is
irrelevant in the present critique.
Turning to Panofsky’s 1939 text, matters are a little more
complicated than as expressed by Huang et al. (2015). For
example, Panofsky is not ignorant of the formal aspects of
Layer 1, the visual features of the image, when he writes:
“The world of pure forms thus recognized as carriers of pri-
mary or natural meanings may be called the world of artistic
motifs” (1939, p. 5). Moreover, he equates the pre-
iconographical description with a “pseudo-formal analysis”
(1939, p. 14).
Indeed, Panofsky considers the “history of style (insight
into the manner in which, under varying historical condi-
tions, objects and events were expressed by forms)” as a
controlling principle at the level of “pre-iconography”
(1939, p. 15). In other words, inventing a new preliminary
sublayer does not make sense in Panofsky’s model. The rea-
son for doing this is, quite evidently, Huang et al.’s (2015)
discussion on automated image retrieval, but why should
Panofsky’s model be part of this?
In terms of discussions about the formal qualities of
images beyond Panofsky, things are again more complex
than just relying on the above-mentioned minimal context
information. “Cultural knowledge,” which Huang et al.
(2015) identify as growing in the transfer from the pre-
iconographical to the iconological sublayer, might not be in
question when it comes to the automated indexing of pixels,
as every digitally created tone of a color can, of course, be
defined within the system, but a color is not just a color in
the image-word negotiation. The human eye can discern an
abundance of tones, far beyond the possible wording of col-
ors. Habitus, disciplinary socialization, and so on, determine
the range of color signifiers (with a range of connotations)
that professionals and laypeople are capable of applying. Put
differently, so-called cultural knowledge is very present at
this level.
What is this type of cultural knowledge more precisely,
with regard to Panofsky? Huang et al.’s (2015) reasoning
about the increase in cultural knowledge reduces the com-
plexity in Panofsky’s interchanges between the pre-
iconographic, iconographic and iconological strata. In short,
his model mirrors the process of a continuous mode of inter-
pretation, where a lower stratum might be informed by a
higher stratum which again qualifies the understanding of
the lower stratum and, further, might inform and displace
meaning at the higher strata, and so on.
In other words, Panofsky’s model reflects a hermeneutic
interpretation, very much inspired by Wilhelm Dilthey (e.g.,
1883) in combining an intuitive hypothesis-formation and a
comparative method reviving and securing the “objectivity”
of the interpretative process. In a note, Panofsky also uses
the term “circulus methodicus” as a parallel to the so-called
“hermeneutic circle” (1939, p. 11). Panofsky (1939) was
published in a slightly expanded second version in 1955. In
the added parts, Panofsky even parallels the interpretative
process with the solving of the Riddle of the Sphinx (1955,
p. 57). That is, the iconological analysis is a demanding pro-
cess: metaphorically speaking, the interpreter is risking his
or her life, as in the myth of the Sphinx and Oedipus.
So, cultural knowledge with regard to Panofsky is the
result of a hermeneutical interpretative process, not the ran-
dom level of the viewers’ cultural knowledge. Thus, Huang
et al.’s (2015) introduction of the above-mentioned “Facet
2: Perspectives on image topicality,” which can be applied
at each layer, seems odd in terms of Panofsky’s model. In
addition, a sentence such as “a viewer may experience the
intrinsic meaning [at the iconological layer] as perceived by
him or her without any external reference” (Huang et al.,
2015, p. 1618), is meaningless with regard to this model. In
their argument, Huang et al. (2015) refer to aesthetic
response theory, which is something quite different.
The use of the “artist’s intent” is problematic as well. As
can be read from Huang et al.’s (2015) explicit quotation of
Panofsky, they consider the intrinsic meaning as “a basic
attitude of a nation, . . .”, etc., “qualified by one personality
and condensed into one work.” This cannot, however, be
equated with the artist’s intent, or “the artist’s intention” or
FIG. 1. Table 1 from Huang et al. (2015).
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“the specific topic(s) originally intended by the artist”
(Huang et al., 2015, p. 1620), but lies beyond the conscious
action of the artist in question. In general, “intentionality”
cannot be reduced to just something intended by the artist. It
is a disputed philosophical term; for example, Panofsky uses
the term “intention” in a self-declared “scholastic” sense
(1940, p. 194), which cannot be elucidated in the present
context.
From a more pragmatic point of view, it may suffice to
say that, considering the overwhelming number of paintings
which have survived few sources are left to document the
artists’ intent or the specific contexts in which the artworks
were originally created. Thus, although the use of the term
“artist’s intent” is widespread in vernacular art history, the
use of it as “perspective” in a theoretical model on image
indexing is questionable.
It is time to ask why this vigilance regarding the use of
Panofsky as a model, when apparently it has been very pro-
ductive in developing new approaches to image indexing in
information studies. First, it should be clear by now that the
model was conceived as the very opposite in comparison to
its current use within this field. Instead of attention to the
hermeneutical process, the purpose has been to segregate
Panofsky’s strata and constitute distinct categories.
This makeover is further accentuated by the fact that Pan-
ofsky’s model might be replaced by more relevant theories,
for example, image semiotics in the structuralistic vein; in
particular, Barthes’ article “La rhetorique de l’image”
(1964) comes to mind. In her seminal texts on subject analy-
sis in images (Shatford, 1984; Shatford Layne, 1986, 1994),
Shatford Layne never really turned to semiotic thinking. In
particular, her distinction between of-ness and about-ness
which, in part, is developed with reference to Gottlob
Frege’s (1892) distinction between Sinn (sense) and Bedeu-
tung (reference), quite obviously invites such an approach.
The scope of this text does not allow an in-depth elabora-
tion of Barthes’ image theory; fortunately, Barthes is not
unknown to information studies (see, e.g., Buckland, 1997;
Carcamo Ulloa, Marcos Mora, Cladellas Pros, & Castello
Tarrida, 2015; Cronin, 2001; Ibekwe-SanJuan, 2012;
Matines-Avila, Smiraglia, Lee, & Fox, 2015; Murphy &
Rafferty, 2015; Raber & Budd, 2003; Rafferty & Albinfalah,
2013). However, a semiotic turn might without further detail
just be affirming a trajectory of indexing not entirely in
accord with the reality of digital and analog picture collec-
tions. For example, Huang et al. (2015) operationalize sever-
al “facets,” “layers,” and “perspectives” that are further
interweaved and expounded in their article. Other theoretical
models embrace a similar complexity (e.g., J€orgensen,
James, & Chang, 2001, p. 938; J€orgensen, 2003, p. 235).
That is (and without doing justice to the strengths of these
examples), they require professional users or indexers if
they were to have practical implications. In light of this,
their possible or future practical implementation in image
collection practice appears labor intensive and time-
consuming in terms of large picture collections.
This impression is further accentuated by the fact that
many picture collections contain huge numbers of objects,
inaccurately indexed, inadequately indexed or indexed using
older methods that need to be converted into new modes. In
addition, new (and partly commercial) platforms and photo-
sharing services exist, and will probably continue to emerge
in the future, with enormous amounts of digital objects, far
beyond the scale and contents of traditional cultural heritage
collections; in addition, in particular the social platforms
will be far beyond the controlled vocabulary of professional
indexers. Instead, users might even radicalize “metadata cre-
ation by democratizing it, intrinsically offering a critique of
the normative symbolizing systems and structures used in
content analysis, as well as the assumed need for consis-
tency, experience and authority in how items are described”
(Murphy & Rafferty, 2015, p. 478). That is, instead of a top-
down controlled enlightenment project with professional
image indexers trying to improve access to large image
bases by way of theoretical models, metadata creation might
be “democratized” bottom-up.
This is not an entirely new approach. In 2008, Enser
briefly touched on “social tagging” as a challenge to profes-
sional subject representation but also pointing at
“opportunities for beneficial enhancement of both exhaus-
tivity and specificity in subject indexing” (p. 534). Subse-
quently, for example, Rorissa (2010) and J€orgensen, Stvilia,
and Wu (2014) highlighted relevant issues in terms of rela-
tionships between controlled index terms and uncontrolled
tagging, although they both, more or less, also “express a
need to ‘tame’ tags” (J€orgensen et al., 2014, p. 847).
Thus, on one side, new methods for image indexing,
conducted by professionals without the assistance of
crowdsourcing, seem to be so demanding of resource that
practical implementation seems unlikely. A new route in
image indexing should probably turn to a less-is-more
approach instead of intricate theoretical models, if they are
aiming at a generalized usage. This invites, however, us to
question the role of indexing when classificatory hierar-
chies and authority are destabilized and access to digital
objects is unlimited in terms of user-generated metadata; at
least when the question is addressing the public audience,
where services to professionals might still be improved. On
the other side, there seem to be at least two obstacles on
this route: user motivation and the apparent development in
tagging from a descriptive to a more social language, at
least if, for example, the observations of two authoritative
voices within the museum field are taken for granted (Bern-
stein, 2014; Simon, 2014).
Last, processes of information-seeking facilitated by way
of technological systems, also have to be taken into consid-
eration. The possibilities of adjusting or training automatic
indexing algorithms in accordance with previous search
terms has, of course, proven itself valuable in commercial
use. Taking this route, the makeover of Panofsky’s (1939)
model might come to an end very fast.
First and foremost, this text was prompted by the preva-
lent misuse of Panofsky’s (1939) interpretation model in
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information studies. Although his common-sense model has
seemingly been productive in developing new approaches to
image indexing, it was conceived as the very opposite in
comparison to the current implementation. If professional
image indexing is to be advanced along this trajectory,
image theory in the structuralistic vein will probably be
more promising as this theory deliberately seeks to segregate
layers of meaning and processes of signification in the
image instead of striving for Panofsky’s (1939) “circulus
methodicus.” However, considering the emergence of social
media platforms and portals to image collections, and the
current status of existing public and private picture collec-
tions containing contain huge numbers of objects inaccurate-
ly indexed, and so on, social tagging and automatic indexing
algorithms might improve picture indexing and seeking in a
more fruitful way.
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